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Abstract: Economic principal-agent theory deals with asymmetric information.
It has two aspects. (i) If one person is better informed than another one, the former
may outwit the latter. Kauṭilya, the Arthaśāstra’s author, and other artha or dharma
authors had a very good understanding of outwitting. (ii) Economic theory teaches
that the person in command of superior knowledge may not always be able to
benefit from this knowledge. He may need the uninformed side to agree to some
mutually beneficial venture. The very fact of asymmetric information may then
harm also the informed side. Judging from the literature surveyed by the author, the
artha and dharma literature had no explicit (openly expressed) understanding of
this second aspect. In the author’s mind, this discussion is related to the “Varuṇa
rule”. This rule (specified in the Manusmṛti) stipulates that the king is to throw
confiscated property into water. We explain this apparent waste of resources as an
implicit solution to the second aspect of principal-agent theory mentioned above.
Keywords: asymmetric information, trust, outwitting problem, gains-from-trade
problem, Varuṇa rule
1 Introduction
Old Indian texts exhibit an amazingly clever perspective on human agency.1
Within economics, this is dealt with under the heading of principal-agent theory.
Roughly speaking, principal-agent theory deals with the problems that arise
from asymmetric information, with one person being better informed than
another one. In recent times, economists have given due credit to Kauṭilya, the
Arthaśāstra’s author, as a very early principal-agent theorist.2
*Corresponding author: Harald Wiese, University of Leipzig, Postfach 920, D-04009 Leipzig,
Germany. E-mail: wiese@wifa.uni-leipzig.de
1 This has already been noted by Zimmer (1969: 89) who observes, in the context of Indian
fables, that Indian political thought was characterized by “cold-blooded cynical realism and
sophistication”.
2 See Brockhoff 2015 and Sihag 2007. In a series of papers, Sihag has highlighted Kauṭilya’s
achievements in other parts of economics, also. A summary of his efforts is Sihag (2014).
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Principal-agent theory is concerned with two closely related problems.
The “outwitting problem” is about tricks to gain the upper hand over some
other person and about tricks to prevent being cheated oneself. It seems clear
that Kauṭilya and other artha or dharma authors had a very good understand-
ing of this problem. One should make clear at the outset that words like
“cheating”, “honest behaviour” or the like do not necessarily imply a moral
judgement, neither on the part of the Old Indian authors nor on the part of the
present one.
Economic principal-agent theory is also about another aspect of asymmetric
information. The person in command of superior knowledge may not always be
able to benefit from this knowledge. Indeed, if he needs the uninformed side to
agree to some mutually beneficial venture, asymmetric information may harm
the informed side by preventing this venture. We call this the “gains-from-trade
problem” of principal-agent theory. We conjecture that there was no explicit
(openly expressed) understanding of the gains-from-trade problem in Old India.
Of course, this is difficult to prove; a text dealing with the gains-from-trade
problem might just have escaped our attention.
In any case, a society’s “understanding” of a problem or a solution to that
problem need not always be present in an explicit manner. Hayek3 has stressed that
useful institutions (such as markets or specific judicial rules) are often not invented
or not even fully understood by us humans. Instead, they spontaneously develop
and are kept if they prove useful. In this sense, institutions may embody “intelli-
gent” solutions. We think that the “Varuṇa rule” specified in the Manusmṛti is a
suitable illustration of such implicit understanding. The “Varuṇa rule” stipulates
that the king is to throw confiscated property into water. This apparent waste of
resources calls out for an explanation.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we explain the two problems
of principal-agent theory in detail. We then turn to the outwitting problem in
Section 3. The gains-from-trade problem is addressed in Section 4. Section 5
concludes.
2 Principal-agent theory
It may seem obvious that a person A who possesses some relevant information not
available to another person P stands to benefit from this superior knowledge.
Relatedly, a person A who cheats another person P will typically profit from
3 Hayek 1973: 8–34.
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that action. This is certainly the idea behind some part of the Old Indian artha
literature, Kauṭilya’s Arthaśāstra (KAŚ) as well as the fable collections Pañcatantra
and Hitopadeśa.
This discussion forms one important branch of economic theory, called
principal-agent theory. It deals with situations where an economic actor, called
the “principal”, wants another actor, the “agent”, to perform certain actions.4
The agent knows about his actions while the principal does not. This state of
affairs is called “asymmetric information”.5
A big chunk of principal-agent theory is concerned with “hidden action”
problems. Consider the example of a firm (the principal) that has employed a
worker (the agent) who may diligently work in the principal’s interest or pursue
his own interests instead. If and insofar the principal cannot observe the effort
exerted by the agent, the principal’s problem is how to supervise or remunerate
the worker so that the interests of the latter are aligned with those of the former.
We term this the “outwitting problem” of principal-agent theory. The agent tries
to outwit the principal: he aspires a high reward without effort. The principal
tries not to be outwitted: he wants to make the agent work hard for as little
remuneration as possible.
Consider Figure 1. The agent (denoted by A) moves first. He may try to outwit
the principal and earn SA while the principal would suffer and obtain the negative
payoff of − SP. S may stand for “stealing” or “scam” and there is no harm in
assuming SA = SP. The dishonest agent is punished with a fine F. Thus, if the
principal is carefree (does not check whether he is taken advantage of), the
payoffs are − SP for the principal and SA − F for the agent. If, however, the
principal is attentive (or careful), he can prevent being outwitted. Then, the cost
C of being careful has to be borne by him, while the agent suffers the fine
and does not profit from his cheating attempt. In contrast, an honest agent strives
for a mutually beneficial deal that yields some gain GA to him and the gain GP to
the principal.
4 A second branch of principal-agent theory (called adverse selection) deals with a principal
who wants the agent to reveal information held by that agent. Outwitting problems for adverse
selection are dealt with in Old Indian texts. For example, the Hitopadeśa (see Törzsök 2007: 271)
offers this advice: “A brahmin, a warrior or a relative should never be appointed as treasurer.”
This is an outwitting problem: Do not employ anybody who might not be able or willing to
honour your trust. In contrast, we are not aware of any Old Indian gains-from-trade problems
within the adverse-selection framework.
5 Textbook presentations of principal-agent theory are Campbell 2006 and Rasmusen 2006.
On two-level structures, see Tirole 1986.
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We assume that all parameters are positive and also SA >GA and SP >C. Figure 1
rests one the premise that the principal knows whether the agent tries to
outwit him or not. If the agent is not honest (i. e., tries to outwit the principal),
the latter will be careful by SP >C. In contrast, the honest agent can expect a
carefree principal by C > 0. Therefore, the agent prefers to be honest and the
agents obtain their gains GP and GA, respectively.
6
We now turn to Figure 2 and the case of imperfect information. The principal
(who chooses between carefree and careful behaviour) does not know whether
the agent is honest (aspiring the mutual gains) or tries to outwit (going after the
scam payoff SA). Instead, with some probability ω the agent tries to outwit the
principal and with probability 1−ω the agent is honest.7 This probability is
known to the principal.
Then, the principal is carefree if his expected payoff for carefree behaviour is
at least as large as his expected payoff for careful behaviour, i. e., if
ω − SPð Þ+ 1−ωð ÞGP ≥ω −Cð Þ+ 1−ωð Þ GP −Cð Þ
or, equivalently, ω ≤ CSP hold.
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tries to
outwit
honest
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P
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carefree
careful
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careful ( )AP GCG ,−
Figure 1: The outwitting problem for perfect information.
6 The game-theoretic solution procedure described for the analysis of Figure 1 is called ‘back-
ward induction’ (see, for example, Gibbons 1992: 55–61).
7 Again, we apply backward induction, this time with a probability for trying to outwit. One
may think of Abraham Lincoln’s famous quote: “You can fool all the people some of the time,
and some of the people all the time, but you cannot fool all the people all the time.” From a
purist point of view, one may argue that we do not have imperfect information here. Indeed, the
standard procedure in principal-agent theory would assume “information partitions” where the
principal’s one is coarser than the agent’s one. However, for the purpose of this paper, there is
no need to go into these game-theoretic details.
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We now turn to the agent’s best outwitting probability. Clearly, it is never
optimal for the agent to choose an outwitting probability that makes the princi-
pal careful. Then, the agent would not obtain SA − F. Therefore, we can focus on
a carefree principal and the agent’s expected payoff
ω SA − Fð Þ + 1−ωð ÞGA
In order to find the agent’s best decision, we need to distinguish between two
situations. We either have a relatively small fine F < SA −GA or a relatively
large fine F > SA −GA. In the small-fine situation (where SA − F >GA holds), the
agent chooses the maximal outwitting probability that keeps the principal
carefree:
ω^= CSP
Then, the payoffs are ω^ − SPð Þ+ 1− ω^ ÞGPð for the principal and ω^ SA − Fð Þ +
1− ω^ÞGA >GAð for the agent.
If the fine is relatively large,
ω^=0
is best for the agent. The payoffs are GP and GA, respectively.
At a first glance, imperfect information seems a problem only for the unin-
formed side (the principal). In fact, however, the possibility of outwitting may
quickly turn into a problem for the informed side (the agent), also. After all, the
principal might shy away from dealing with the agent and thus prevent a
mutually benefical arrangement. Thus, there is a related “gains-from-trade
problem”: How can a hard-working agent convince the principal that he, indeed,
is very useful so that the principal is prepared to pay a high wage or to employ
him at all?
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Figure 2: The outwitting problem for imperfect information.
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We analyse this with the help of Figure 3. Here, the principal has the choice
of entering into a contractual agreement with the agent. If he does not, he
obtains a zero payoff.
If the fine is relatively large, the principal foresees the outwitting probability
ω^ =0 and can earn the payoff GP > 0 by contracting with the agent. If, however,
the fine is relatively small, the outwitting probability is ω^= CSP and, hence,
contracting with the agent pays only for
ω^ − SPð Þ+ 1− ω^

GP = −C + 1− CSP
 
GP > 0

or
GP >
C
1− CSP
=
1
1
C −
1
SP
Inversely, the principal (the uninformed side) does not enter into a deal with
the agent
– if the fine is smaller than the difference between the agent’s scam payoff
and the agent’s gain from honest trading (F < SA −GAÞ,
– if the principal’s gain GP from dealing with the agent is relatively small,
– if the principal’s cost of careful behaviour C is relatively large and his scam
payoff SP relatively small (remember our assumption SP >C).
Therefore, the agent may hope for a large fine (the first bullet point) if he cannot
otherwise convince the principal to deal with him (the second and third bullet
point).
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Figure 3: The gains-from-trade problem for imperfect information.
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3 Principal-agent theory’s outwitting problem
3.1 Hitopadeśa/ Pañcatantra
In the Pañcatantra, trust and the outwitting problem are often dealt with. See,
for example,
‘He is my friend!’ – is that any reason to trust a scoundrel?
‘I have done him a great many favors!’ – that counts for nothing!
‘This man is my very own relative!’ – that’s an old folk tale!
People are driven by money alone, no matter how small.8
The Pañcatantra’s “central message” is that “craft and deception constitute the
major art of government”. But: “Deception, of course, is a double-edged sword; it is
important to use it against others, but just as importantly one must guard against
its use by others against oneself. So, in a sense, even the losers provide counter-
examples”.9 We refer the reader to section 2 where the attempt of outwitting (on the
agent’s part) and the care taken by the principal to prevent this has been formally
modelled.
The serious problem of asymmetric information is neatly summarized in the
Hitopadeśa:
If you have to cross an impassable ocean, you have a boat;
when darkness comes, you have a lamp;
[…]
Thus there is no problem in the world for which
the Creator has not carefully invented some solution.
But when it comes to countering a wicked person’s way of thinking,
it seems to me that even the Creator has failed in his efforts.10
Turning to the model of section 2, we can translate the principal’s impossibility
of reading the agent’s mind into large cost C of being careful. Then, CSP is large
and the principal is likely to be defrauded.
Thus, the fables provide ample material for the outwitting problem. In
contrast, we did not manage to find gains-from-trade problems in the two
fable collections.
8 See Olivelle 2006: 271.
9 These quotes are found in Olivelle 2006: 40–41. Wiese 2012 argues that this art amounts to
applying the game theoretic method of backward induction.
10 See Törzsök 2007: 323.
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3.2 Kauṭilya
Kauṭilya is a foremost expert on outwitting problems or so it seems from the
evidence found by the current author. For example, in Arthaśāstra 4.8,11
Kauṭilya advises the king to investigate wrongdoings “through interrogation and
torture” and suggests in KAŚ 1.1012 to find out about “the ministers’ integrity […]
through secret tests”.
Trying to cheat and preventing to be cheated upon is the aim of KAŚ 7.17,13
where Kauṭilya discusses peacemaking through hostages and writes: “The taking of
a kinsman or a chief constitutes a hostage. In this event, the one who gives a
traitorous minister or a traitorous offspring is the one who outwits. One who does
the opposite is outwitted”.14 It is from this translation by Olivelle that the “out-
witting” problem has obtained its name.15 Again, gains-from-trade problems were
not found in the Arthaśāstra.16
3.3 Varuṇa as chastiser of kings
3.3.1 How can an unjust king be punished?
Sometimes, the actions that someone expects another one to perform (or the
actions that the first expects the second to avoid) are in line with dharma
texts. Viṣṇu 517 lists the punishments to be administered by the king in some
detail, for “crimes deserving capital punishments”, for “offences against
upper classes by lower classes”, for “verbal abuse and assault”, for “sexual
crimes”, and so on. A king’s responsibility for punishment is clear from many
texts. For example, Manu 7.1618 demands:
11 See Olivelle 2013: 239–241.
12 See Olivelle 2013: 75–76.
13 See Olivelle 2013: 323–325.
14 See KAŚ 7.17.11–13 in Olivelle 2013: 323.
15 The Sanskrit root for “outwit” is ati-sam-dhā (KAŚ 7.17.12–13 in Kangle 1969: 199). Kangle
(1972: 376) translates as “over-reach”.
16 It seems that all the examples given by Sihag 2007 and Brockhoff 2015 clearly fall into the
category of outwitting problems. Sihag 2014: ch. 11 discusses how Kauṭilya deals with incentive
problems (i. e., with methods used by employers to attract good workers and make the employed
ones work hard in the employers’ interests).
17 See Olivelle 2009: 56–62, 230–244.
18 See Olivelle 2005: 154, 615.
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The king should administer appropriate Punishment on men who behave improperly [...]
[...] yathārhataḥ saṃpraṇayen nareṣv anyāyavartiṣu
One good reason for punishment is given by Manu 7.2019:
If the king fails to administer Punishment tirelessly on those who ought to be punished,
the stronger will grill the weak like fish on a spit
yadi na praṇayed rājā daṇḍaṃ daṇḍyeṣv atandritaḥ |
śūle matsyān ivāpakṣyan durbalān balavattarāḥ
The Indian texts now start to worry about the king’s incentives to admimister
justice in the correct manner. As the famous Latin saying goes: “quis custodiet
custodes ipsos”, i. e., who supervises the supervisors? One answer given by
Manu 9.24520 points to Varuṇa as chastiser of kings: Varuṇa
holds the rod of punishment over kings
rājñāṃ daṇḍadharo hi saḥ
We then have a two-level structure where Varuṇa can punish the king who in
turn can punish his subjects. At this juncture, one might worry about Varuṇa’s
incentives to chastise the king appropriately. Can we run into a regressus ad
infinitum? Presumably not, because the god Varuṇa does not encounter any
incentive problems, himself.
The same idea is expressed in Arthaśāstra 4.13.4321:
Varuṇa is the one who disciplines kings when they act wrongly with respect to men
śāstā hi varuṇo rājñāṃ mithyā vyācaratāṃ nṛṣu
Thus, the subjects in Indian artha and dharma books are monitored and pun-
ished (if need be) in order to make them act according to dharma.
So far, we have looked at “Varuṇa as chastiser of kings” from the perspective of
two-level punishment. We now suggest to take the point of view of principal-agent
theory. In that perspective, the king is the agent who administers justice towards his
subjects, the principals. In terms of our model in section 2, the subjects “deal” with
the king (the agent) by living in his realm or choosing to settle there. The king (as
agent) then may outwit his subjects (the principals) by administering justice in a
selfserving manner. Finally, the subjects may employ some cost and scrutinize the
king’s handling of justice.
19 See Olivelle 2005: 155, 615–616.
20 See Olivelle 2005: 202, 792.
21 See Olivelle 2013: 252 and Kangle 1969: 150.
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In this setting, the role of Vaṛuna consists of fining the misbehaving king.
One might argue (with Manu) that the king will fulfill his rājadharma if he is
afraid of the chastiser Vaṛuna. Indeed, this is in line with the role of the fine F in
our model in section 2. However, for the “Vaṛuna the chastiser” argument to go
through, it is not the king’s belief that is relevant. Rather, the subjects need to
believe that the king is a believer. Thus, we need second-order beliefs22 which
are more difficult to uphold than first-order ones.
If the belief argument is too facile, we need to supply additional arguments of
how Varuṇa’s punishment might work. Does it imply that the king, the most
powerful agent himself, would somehow need to punish himself? Against this
idea, Kane23 has already opined that “these prescriptions [...] were counsels of
perfection and must have been futile. No king would ordinarily fine himself”. He
then refers to medieval texts where the king is understood as a “subordinate chief”.
Then, it is notVaruṇa himself who is doing the punishing, but the overlord, instead.
This is a good explanation, as far as it goes. However, it just pushes up the problem
one level. After all, how would, then, an unjust overlord be brought to justice?
Derrett24 criticizes Kane by pointing to “the hieratic element in ancient
Indian society”. While Derrett does not explain how exactly he envisions the
priestly involvement in this matter, we also think it best not to construe Manu or
Kauṭilya in this way. We will take up this problem and Kane’s dictum (“no king
would ordinarily fine himself”) in section 4.
3.3.2 Why Varuṇa?
Before doing so, we turn to the question of why Varuṇa, and not some other
god from the Hindu pantheon, is responsible for the punishment of kings.
Here, we can follow Oberlies25 back to Vedic times: Indra is one of the most
important Vedic gods. He is especially known as the slayer of the demon Vṛta, an
act by which the waters were freed. Indra’s world is a raw, unfinished business. It is
Varuṇa who then determines the sun’s orbit and the rivers’ paths. Analogously,
Indra and Varuṇa are involved in the Vedic clans’ living. Oberlies stresses the
phases of yoga (yoking the horses in order to move to new areas in fighting mode)
and kṣema (peaceful settlement). Indra is associated with yoga. He is invoked by the
Vedic clans that hope for victory. In contrast, Varuṇa and other related gods see to
the orderly functioning of settled human society.
22 See Geanakoplos 1994.
23 Kane 1973: 176–177.
24 Derrett 1975b: 193, fn. 1.
25 Oberlies 2012: 96–105.
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Against this background, we can understand the work by Thieme26 on gods
that deal with contracts and truth-telling, i. e., principal-agent problems. In
classical Sanskrit, mitram is a neuter (!) noun meaning friend. Thieme27 clearly
sides with Antoine Meillet who claims that, in Vedic times, the meaning of
mitram was “contract” from which the meaning of friendship and then friend
developed. Thieme cites the Ṛgveda (RV) to support Meillet’s and his own claim:
Contract, when named, makes peoples array (arrange) themselves [with regard to each
other] ( = ‘causes them to make mutual arrangements’).28
He adds that “[a]lso other godsmay receive this qualification: God Fire (Agni), the fire
being invoked as a witness at the conclusion of certain contracts [...] or God Varuna,
that is the personified Oath [...] or, as I should prefer, the personified True Speech.”29
Mitra and Varuṇa are often mentioned together:
You two (Mitra and Varuna, i.e., Contract and True-Speech) are of firm peace through vow
( = you secure peace by seeing to it that vows are kept), you cause people to make mutual
agreements through firmness ( = you make contractual agreements desirable as establish-
ing firm relations).30
They produce very beneficial results:
You two, king Contract and king True-Speech, made firm earth and heaven by your
greatness. Cause plants to grow, cause cows to swell [with milk], send down rain, you of
live wetness!31
Thieme comments: “The originalmotivation for their creating prosperity is, of course,
that Contract and True-Speech secure peace.”32 From the perspective of this paper,
prosperity can flourish because the principal-agent problems are overcome.
Of course, there must be some sanctions if somebody does not keep a
contract:
These two (Contract and True-Speech) have many slings (in which to catch a cunning
transgressor), they are fetterers of untruth, difficult for the deceitful mortal to circumvent.33
Thus, Varuṇa as chastiser of king has Vedic credentials.
26 Thieme 1957.
27 Thieme 1957: 18.
28 See RV 3.59.1a in Thieme 1957: 39.
29 See Thieme 1957: 40–41.
30 See RV 5.72.2ab in Thieme 1957: 41.
31 See RV 5.62.3 in Thieme 1957: 43.
32 Thieme 1957: 43.
33 See RV 7.65.3ab in Thieme 1957: 52.
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4 Principal-agent theory’s gains-from-trade
problem
We claim that the gains-from-trade problem might not have been obvious to Old
Indian thinkers on dharma and artha. Be that as it may, this problem was
“known” by the institutions in the sense of Hayek (see the introduction). Some
Indian dharma texts mention the punishment of confiscating property (see also
the conclusion).34 It is surely significant that the quotations about Varuṇa as the
chastiser of kings (subsection 3.3.1) occur in the context of casting property or
fines into water or giving them to Brahmins. In Manu 9.242–247,35 we read:
242 When others [i.e., not Brahmins, HW] commit these sins [causing loss of caste, HW],
however, they deserve to have all their property confiscated, if they did them thought-
lessly, or to be executed,36 if they did them wilfully.
243 A good king must never take the property of someone guilty of a grievous sin causing
loss of caste; if he takes it out of greed, he becomes tainted with the same sin.
244 He should offer that fine to Varuṇa by casting it into water, or present it to a Brahmin
endowed with learning and virtue.
245 Varuṇa is the lord of punishment, for he holds the rod of punishment over kings; and a
Brahmin who has mastered the Veda is the lord of the entire world.
246 When a king refrains from taking the fines of evildoers, in that land are born in due
course men with long lives;
247 the farmers’ crops ripen, each as it was sown; children do not die; and no deformed
child is born.
242 itare kṛtavantas tu pāpāny etāny akāmataḥ |
sarvasvahāram arhanti kāmatas tu pravāsanam
243 nādadīta nṛpaḥ sādhur mahāpātakino dhanam |
ādadānas tu tal lobhāt tena doṣena lipyate
244 apsu praveśya taṃ daṇḍaṃ varuṇāyopapādayet |
śrutavṛttopapanne vā brāhmaṇe pratipādayet
245 īśo daṇḍasya varuṇo rājñāṃ daṇḍadharo hi saḥ |
īśaḥ sarvasya jagato brāhmaṇo vedapāragaḥ
246 yatra varjayate rājā pāpakṛdbhyo dhanāgamam |
tatra kālena jāyante mānavā dīrghajīvinaḥ
247 niṣpadyante ca sasyāni yathoptāni viśāṃ pṛthak |
bālāś ca na pramīyante vikṛtaṃ ca na jāyate
34 The property of both the culprit and its relatives could be confiscated according to a Tamil
inscription from 988 CE (see Sastri 1931/1932).
35 See Olivelle 2005: 202, 791–792.
36 Bühler 1886: 384 translates as “banished”. Olivelle 2005: 332 can point to some commen-
taries supporting his understanding (e. g., Mandlik, 1886, vol II: 1237–1238). This controversy is
unimportant here.
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Arthaśāstra 4.13.42–4337 has these prescriptions:
42 For a king fining someone who does not deserve to be fined, the fine is 30 times that
amount. He should place it in water for Varuṇa, and then give it to Brāhmaṇas.
43 By that, the king’s sin caused by wrongful infliction of fines is cleansed, for Varuṇa is
the one who disciplines kings when they act wrongly with respect to men.
42 adaṇḍya daṇḍane rājño daṇḍas triṃśadguṇo ‘mbhasi |
varuṇāya pradātavyo brāhmaṇebhyas tataḥ param
43 tena tat pūyate pāpaṃ rājño daṇḍāpacārajam |
śāstā hi varuṇo rājñāṃ mithyā vyācaratāṃ nṛṣu
There is an obvious parallel in Yājñavalkya II.30738:
If the king has taken a fine unlawfully, he himself should give it to Varuṇa [and then] thirty
times [that fine] to the Brahmins, having informed them [about the unlawful fine].
rājñā ‘nyāyena yo daṇḍo gṛhīto varuṇāya tam
nivedya dadyāt viprebhyaḥ svayam triṃśadguṇīkṛtam
Superficially, these passages are clear and do not present any translational diffi-
culties.39 InManu, the king is strongly advised not to keep any confiscated property
for himself or his treasury. Instead, he should throw it into the water or give it to the
Brahmins.Manu expounds the negative consequences of the king’s confiscating for
himself (in 9.243) and the positive consequences of not doing so (in 9.246–247). We
call the prescription to give the fine “to Varuṇa by casting it into water” the “Varuṇa
clause”. Strictly speaking, “casting into water” and confiscation are contradictory
terms. Lat. fiscus means treasury and confiscation hence “adjoining the treasury”.
From this perspective, one might say that Manu 9.242–247 forbids confiscation.
However, we will understand confiscation as asset forfeiture or asset seizure,
irrespective of how the property taken40 is dealt with.
37 See Olivelle 2013: 252 and Kangle 1969: 150.
38 See Sāhityācārya/Sāhityopādhyāya 1930: 753 or Banerji 1996: 63. Derrett (1975b: 193, fn 1)
points to this rule about the “destination of the fine”. The reading given here is to be preferred
to the one found in Sastri (1982, part I: 298): rājñā nyāyena yo daṇḍo ‘gṛhīto varuṇāya tam.
39 The commentaries on Manu (see Mandlik, 1886, vol II: 1237–1239; Derrett, 1975a: 189–190,
Derrett, 1975b: 271–272) are short and do not mention specific problems.
40 In Nāradasmṛti 18.12 (in Lariviere, 2003: 222, 426) and in Manu 8.399 (in Olivelle, 2005: 188,
740) we have the root hṛ. In contrast, Manu 10.96 (in Olivelle, 2005: 213, 829) uses the expression
nirdhanaṃ kṛ. In the Lekhapaddhati-Lekhapañcāśīkā (Gujarat, 13th to 15th century), we have
vyāṣedha which is translated by Strauch (2002: 157–158, 351–352) as confiscation, but refers to a
tax in a specific area (Strauch, 2002: 351, fn. 1). Confiscation in the proper sense of the word is
expressed by rāja-saṃjātyāṃ kṛ (Strauch, 2002: 158, 352–353). Both these uses do not refer to
confiscation in the context of criminal law.
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The Arthaśāstra also mentions water, but here, Kauṭilya does not seriously
entertain the possibility of casting the fines (this time to be paid by the king
himself) into the water. Instead, “place it in water for Varuṇa, and then give it to
Brāhmaṇas” seems to be a short description of a ceremony by which the king is
cleansed of his judicial mistake.
Similarly, the Manu commentator Rāghavānanda seems to consider the
Brahmins as the final receivers:
Indeed, however, aiming at Varuṇa, it should be given to a Brahmin. Therefore,
Yājñavalkya required expiation for the Brahmin who accepts that wealth
vastutas tu varuṇāya saṃkalpya viprāyopapādayet ata eva tad dhanaṃ svīkartur viprasya
prāyascittam āha yājñavalkyaḥ41
Rāghavānanda probably alludes to Yājñavalkya III.28942:
If a person should have accepted bad things, he is cleansed by staying in a cowshed for
one month, practising chastity, observing the vow to subsist only on milk, and engaging in
Gāyatrī prayer.
goṣṭhe vasan brahmacārī māsam ekaṃ payovrataḥ
gāyatrījapyanirataḥ śuddhyate ‘satpratigrahāt
However, it seems unlikely that the property taken from guilty people and given
to a Brahmin come under the heading of “bad things”. Also, while Yājñavalkya
recommends confiscation (see conclusion), the giving of the confiscated prop-
erty to Brahmins is not found in that text. In any case, some Manu commentators
understand “casting into water” as a serious option. For example, Medhātithi
requests to meditate on the receiver Varuṇa:
meditating “this is to Varuṇa” in one’s mind, he [the king] should throw it into waters
varunāyedam iti manasā dhyāyann apsu dadyāt43
Why should Manu demand that the king does not keep the confiscated property
taken from the offenders? Is it not pure waste to throw the property into the
water? Of course, one might point to the alternative of giving the property to
Brahmins. After all, Brahmins do often benefit from unclaimed property. If a
treasure-trove is found, Viṣṇu 3.56–6144 lets the Brahmins obtain 5/12, 1/4, 1/2,
41 See Mandlik 1886, vol II: 1239 on Manu 9.245.
42 See Sāhityācārya/Sāhityopādhyāya 1930: 1042. This corresponds very closely to Yājñavalkya
III.284 (in Sastri, 1982, part II: 167).
43 See Mandlik 1886, vol II: 1238 on Manu 9.244.
44 See Olivelle 2009: 54, 224.
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or all of it, depending on the social class of the finder. In support of the Brahmin
alternative, Balbir Sihag (in a personal communication) points out that silver
coins could be picked up by anyone (possibly undeserving) and that houses or
cows cannot be thrown into water for other obvious reasons.
One may, then, as also suggested by Balbir Sihag, see the Varuṇa clause
as another clever device by Brahmins to gain influence and wealth. That is
certainly a valid point. However, to our mind, there is more behind the Varuṇa
clause. We have discussed above that the king who does not have an overlord is
in a difficult position. He certainly likes to be reckoned a just king and enjoy the
loyalty of his ministers and subjects. The importance of loyalty is clearly spelled
out in Arthaśāstra 7.5.19–2745:
19[…] by casting away good people and embracing evil people,
by initiating unprecedented and unrighteous acts of violence;
20by discontinuing customary and righteous practices,
by addiction to what is unrighteous,
and by severing himself from what is righteous;
[…]
26through the negligence and lazyness of the king or the destruction of enterprise and
security,
there arise the impoverishment, greed, and disloyalty of subjects.
27When impoverished, subjects become greedy; when they are greedy, they
become disloyal;
and when they are disloyal, they either go over to the enemy or kill their
lord themselves.
19avakṣepena […] satām asatāṃ pragraheṇa ca |
abhūtānāṃ ca hiṃsānām adharmyāṇāṃ pravartanaiḥ
20ucitānāṃ caritrāṇāṃ dharmiṣṭhānāṃ nivartanaiḥ |
adharmasya prasaṅgena dharmasyāvagraheṇa ca
[…]
26rājñaḥ pramādālasyābhyāṃ yogakṣemavadhena vā |
prakṛtīnāṃ kṣayo lobho vairāgyaṃ copajāyate
27kṣīṇāḥ prakṛtayo lobhaṃ lubdhā yānti virāgatām |
viraktā yānty amitraṃ vā bhartāraṃ ghnanti vā svayam
Now, in his position relative to his subjects, the king is the agent who knows best
whether he acts justly. How can he, even if well-intended, convince the subjects?
Just saying: “I am a just king” will generally not suffice. In game-theory parlance,
this would just be “cheap talk” and hence not credible.
Here, the Varuṇa clause may help the king to “prove” that he is a good king,
a king who would not take property as a fine in order to enrich himself or in
45 See Olivelle 2013: 290 and Kangle 1969: 176.
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order to fill his depleted treasury. The best way to do this would then be a ritual,
with Brahmins performing the rites and many onlookers. Indeed, Chwe46
advances the interesting idea that rituals serve the purpose of producing “com-
mon knowledge”, here, the common knowledge of a just king. 47
We now return to Kane’s assertion that “[n]o king would ordinarily fine
himself”. From the perspective of the gains-from-trade problem one might reply:
Maybe, he would not, but he would like to be able to. Indeed, section 2 shows
that a high fine may lead the agent to deal honestly. And this will often be in the
agent’s own interest, earning the payoff GA rather than zero. Varuṇa, the
chastiser of kings, may be of some help. But, if that is not enough, the king
has to incur some cost, for example by offering the confiscated property “to
Varuṇa by casting it into water”.
5 Conclusions
It is very difficult not to be impressed by the social insights that are present in
Indian texts, explicitly and implicitly. It is the thesis of this paper that, in the
realm of principal-agent theory, Kauṭilya, the fable writers, and others had a
clear understanding of outwitting problems: How to find out about the enemy’s
intention and prevent the enemy from finding out about one’s own plans, how to
outwit and not to be outwitted. With respect to the gains-from-trade problem,
the relevant knowledge was embodied in some rules, but probably not properly
understood.48
So far, the Varuṇa clause has not gained the attention it deserves. Kane49
mentions Manu 9.242, but does not offer any comments beyond those dealt with
above. Interestingly, the clause present in Manu is not to be found in other
mūlasmṛtis we looked at:
46 Chwe 2001.
47 Common knowledge is said to be present between actors A and B if A knows something, B
knows that A knows it, A knows that B knows that A knows etc. ad infinitum.
48 Sihag (2007: 41) is certainly overdoing his praise for Kauṭilya while playing down the
advances made in game theory: “Although Kautilya does not provide any formal analysis, his
approach contains almost all the ingredients of a [sic, HW] game theory. He was certainly not
aware of the numerous new jargons, such as sequential rationality, [...] which have been added
to the vocabulary during the past few decades to study strategic interactions.”
49 Kane 1973: 404.
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Contrary to the above table, one may argue that both Arthaśāstra 4.13.42
and Yājñavalkya II.307 deal with a variant of the Varuṇa clause. However,
these authors deal with punishments for kings who do not justly punish.
Confiscation Varuṇa clause
Mānava-dharmaśāstra yes yes
Nārada-smṛti yes no
Vaiṣṇava-dharmaśāstra yes no
Kauṭilya-arthaśāstra yes no
Yājñavalkya-smṛti yes no
Bṛhaspati-smṛti yes no
Āpastamba-dharmasūtra no no
Gautama- dharmasūtra no no
Baudhāyana-dharmasūtra yes no
Vasiṣṭha-dharmasūtra no no
50 The citations above and Manu 8.374–375 (in Olivelle, 2005: 186, 734–735); Manu 8.399 (in
Olivelle, 2005: 188, 740) and Manu 10.96 (in Olivelle, 2005: 213, 829).
51 See Nārada 12.70 in Lariviere 2003: 199, 392, Nārada 18.11–12 in Lariviere 2003: 221–222, 426,
Nārada 19.35 in Lariviere 2003: 229, 439, and Nārada 19.49 in Lariviere 2003: 230, 442.
52 See Viṣṇu 3.31 in Olivelle 2009: 53, 222 and Viṣṇu 5.180 in Olivelle 2009: 61, 242.
53 See subsection 3.2.
54 In section IV, KAŚ 4.13.42–43 does not refer to confiscation, but to a fine paid by the king.
55 Yājñavalkya II.187 (in Sāhityācārya/Sāhityopādhyāya, 1930: 668), reads:
If a person steals public property and violates the custom [?],
he should be made to leave the kingdom after all his property has been taken.
gaṇadravyaṃ hared yas tu saṃvidaṃ laṅghayec ca yaḥ
sarvasvaharaṇaṃ kṛtvā taṃ rāṣṭrād vipravāsayet
The Sanskrit text is practically the same in Yājñavalkya II.191 (in Sastri, 1982, part I: 267).
56 In section IV, Yājñavalkya II.307 does not refer to confiscation, but to a fine paid by the king.
57 Bṛhaspati 24.14 (in Aiyangar, 1941: 190) reads:
Who, however, has intercourse by a trick, his punishment is taking of everything.
chadmanā kāmayed yas tu tasya sarvaharo damaḥ
58 See Olivelle 2000.
59 The “legitimate seizure of property” in Gautama 18.24–32 (in Olivelle, 2000: 166–169) refers
to takings by private individuals from others, in particular arising from needs with respect to
marriage and hunger.
60 Baudhāyana 1.18.19 (in Olivelle, 2000: 234–235) reads:
When a man belonging to the Kṣatriya or lower class kill a Brahmin, he should be executed
and all his property confiscated.
kṣatriyādīnāṃ brāhmaṇavadhe vadhaḥ sarvasvaharaṇaṃ ca
61 See Olivelle 2000.
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In contrast, the Varuṇa clause is about property punishments inflicted by
the king.
One may criticize this paper for not comparing different possible methods of
instilling confidence into the king’s just behaviour (but see the discussion in section
3.3.1). After all, the Varuṇa clause is only one such method (if the current author is
correct in this regard). Our main excuse is that a list of all these methods is not at
hand. And even with such a list, a relative evaluation might prove very difficult. In
that sense, the paper is more modest than one may hope for.
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